How a Single Password Destroyed a 158-Year-Old Trucking Empire

One weak password. That's all it took to destroy 158 years of business.

In June 2023, attackers guessed an employee's password at KNP Logistics Group, one of the UK's largest privately owned logistics companies. Three months later, the company entered administration (the UK equivalent of bankruptcy). Nearly 730 employees lost their jobs. Hundreds of trucks stopped rolling. The Akira ransomware gang had encrypted everything, including the backups.

KNP had cyber insurance. They followed industry-standard IT protocols. They'd survived world wars and economic recessions. None of it mattered once attackers owned that one credential.

Here's what this post covers: why trucking has become a prime target for ransomware, the real costs that go far beyond ransom payments, and what separates the companies that survive from the ones that don't.

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The Pattern: Why Trucking Has Become a Prime Target

KNP's collapse isn't an outlier. Ransomware attacks on the transportation and logistics sector have accelerated, and the consequences are severe.

Ward Transport (March 2024): The DragonForce ransomware gang claimed responsibility for attacking this major trucking company, causing operational disruption. Third-party researchers reported significant data exfiltration. DragonForce has since gained prominence as one of the more active ransomware-as-a-service operations, targeting transportation companies globally with double-extortion tactics.

Forward Air (December 2020): A ransomware attack (believed to be the Hades gang, with possible links to Evil Corp) forced this trucking giant to suspend electronic data interfaces with customers. The result: $7.5 million in lost LTL revenue in a single quarter. Operations were disrupted for at least a couple of weeks as the company worked to recover.

ORBCOMM (September 2023): This attack hit an ELD vendor, not a trucking company directly, but the downstream impact was significant. Some of the country's largest freight transportation companies lost the ability to track fleets and inventory. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration had to issue emergency waivers allowing drivers to use paper logs. An attack on one vendor rippled through its customer base.

The lesson? You don't have to be the direct target to become a victim.

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The Cost: What Ransomware Actually Takes From Transportation Companies

IBM's 2024 Cost of a Data Breach Report found the global average breach cost reached $4.88 million, a 10% jump from the previous year and the largest increase since the pandemic. Healthcare saw the highest costs ($9.77 million average), but breach costs across industrial and infrastructure sectors consistently exceed the global average.

But the dollar figure understates the real damage. Consider what a ransomware attack actually destroys:

Operational continuity. When systems go down, trucks don't move. Freight doesn't ship. Customers don't get served. Forward Air couldn't release freight for weeks. ORBCOMM's customers lost fleet visibility entirely.

Recovery time. IBM's research found that only 12% of breached organizations fully recovered, and for those that did, recovery took more than 100 days. KNP never recovered at all.

Reputation and relationships. Customers and partners don't wait around while you rebuild. The trucking companies that depended on ORBCOMM had to scramble to paper logs and manual processes. Some of those relationships don't survive.

Insurance limitations. KNP had a £1 million cyber insurance policy. It wasn't enough. Insurance can cover some costs, but it can't restore encrypted data, rebuild damaged systems, or bring back lost customers.

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The Speed Problem: Why Traditional Security Responses Can't Keep Up

Modern ransomware attacks move fast. According to CrowdStrike's 2025 Global Threat Report, the average "breakout time" (the gap between initial access and lateral movement to other systems) dropped to just 48 minutes. The fastest observed breakout time was 51 seconds.

That's how long attackers need to go from "we're in" to "we're everywhere."

Manual incident response doesn't work at these speeds. By the time your IT team realizes something's wrong, attackers have already accessed multiple systems, established persistence, and located their targets. CrowdStrike recommends the 1-10-60 rule: detect threats within one minute, investigate within ten minutes, and respond within sixty minutes. Most organizations can't meet that standard.

The KNP attack illustrates what happens when response is too slow. The Akira group gained initial access through a compromised password, deployed ransomware, and encrypted critical systems, including backups. The company faced a ransom demand it couldn't pay. Three months of paralysis led to administration.

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Why Trucking Is Especially Vulnerable

The transportation sector presents an attractive target for several reasons:

High operational pressure. Trucking companies can't afford extended downtime. Every day a fleet sits idle costs money. This pressure makes companies more likely to consider paying ransoms. Attackers know this.

Distributed operations. Unlike a traditional office environment, trucking operations span thousands of endpoints: trucks, terminals, mobile devices, ELD systems, warehouse management systems. Each endpoint is a potential entry point.

Critical infrastructure status. Trucks move approximately 70% of the nation's freight by weight. Disrupting trucking disrupts the entire supply chain. This criticality makes the sector a target for both financially motivated criminals and nation-state actors.

Vendor interdependency. The ORBCOMM attack demonstrated how a single vendor compromise can cascade through an entire ecosystem. Trucking companies depend on ELD providers, TMS systems, dispatch platforms, and countless other third-party services. Each one represents supply chain risk.

State-sponsored targeting. The FBI, NSA, and CISA have issued multiple advisories warning that Russian military cyber actors specifically target transportation systems as critical infrastructure. These aren't opportunistic attacks. They're strategic operations.

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What Separates the Survivors From the Casualties

Some organizations recover from ransomware. Others collapse. The difference usually comes down to preparation, not luck.

Offline backups that actually work

KNP's backups were encrypted alongside their primary systems. This is depressingly common. Backups only help if they're isolated from your main network, tested regularly, and actually restorable.

The test: When was the last time you actually restored from backup and verified everything worked? If you can't answer that question, your backup strategy is theoretical.

Network segmentation

When attackers gained access to KNP's network, they were able to encrypt everything. This suggests limited segmentation. Once they were in, they had access to critical systems.

Strong segmentation means a breach in one area doesn't automatically become a total compromise. Your email system shouldn't have a direct path to dispatch. Your accounting software shouldn't live on the same network segment as your ELD systems. Segmentation creates barriers that slow attackers down and limit damage.

Pre-established incident response partnerships

Ward Transport had cybersecurity partnerships in place before they were attacked. When the incident occurred, they knew who to call. They had contracts already signed, relationships already built. This allowed them to respond quickly rather than scrambling to find help mid-crisis.

Contrast this with organizations that try to negotiate incident response contracts while their systems are burning. The difference in recovery time is substantial.

Vendor risk assessment

When ORBCOMM went down, their affected customers felt the pain immediately. But how many of those customers had conducted serious vendor risk assessments? How many had contingency plans for ELD system failures?

Know which vendors are critical to your operations. Understand their security posture. Have backup plans for when (not if) something goes wrong.

Multi-factor authentication

The KNP attack started with a password that attackers guessed. MFA wouldn't have made the company invulnerable, but it would have made that initial access significantly harder to achieve.

Too many organizations still rely on passwords alone for critical systems. Given that stolen or compromised credentials remain one of the most common initial access vectors, MFA represents basic hygiene that too few companies implement consistently.

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The Real Entry Points: Where Attacks Actually Start

Understanding how attackers get in is the first step toward keeping them out. The most common entry points aren't sophisticated zero-day exploits. They're failures of basic security hygiene.

Compromised credentials. The KNP attack started with a weak password. CrowdStrike's research shows that stolen or compromised credentials remain one of the top initial access vectors. Attackers don't need to hack your systems if they can just log in with legitimate credentials.

Phishing and social engineering. Vishing attacks (voice phishing) increased 442% between the first and second half of 2024. Attackers call IT helpdesks pretending to be employees, request password resets, and gain access. No technical exploit required.

Unpatched vulnerabilities. Initial access techniques accounted for 52% of vulnerabilities observed by CrowdStrike in 2024. Many of these are known vulnerabilities with available patches that organizations simply haven't applied.

Third-party compromise. The ORBCOMM attack showed how vendor compromises cascade to customers. Attackers increasingly target the supply chain rather than the ultimate victim directly.

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Building Real Resilience: A Practical Framework

Security isn't a product you buy. It's a capability you build. Here's what that looks like for trucking and logistics operations:

Identity and access management

Implement MFA across all systems, starting with the most critical. Use strong, unique passwords and consider passwordless authentication where possible. Regularly audit who has access to what, and revoke access immediately when employees leave or change roles.

Network architecture

Segment your network so that compromising one system doesn't mean compromising everything. Separate operational technology from IT systems. Limit what any single credential can access.

Backup strategy

Maintain offline backups that can't be reached from your production network. Test restoration regularly. Actually restore from backup, don't just verify the backup exists. Know how long full restoration takes so you can plan accordingly.

Incident response planning

Have a plan before you need it. Know who you'll call, what your first steps will be, and who makes decisions during a crisis. Conduct tabletop exercises to practice response. Build relationships with incident response firms before an incident occurs.

Vendor management

Assess the security posture of critical vendors. Understand what happens to your operations if they go down. Build redundancy where possible, and have contingency plans where it isn't.

Employee training

Your people are both your biggest vulnerability and your first line of defense. Train them to recognize phishing attempts. Create a culture where reporting suspicious activity is encouraged, not punished. Make security everyone's job.

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The Question Every Fleet Operator Should Ask

After KNP collapsed, their director revealed he never told the employee whose password was compromised. Think about that: one person made a mistake that ended a 158-year-old company, and they don't even know it.

This isn't about blame. Everyone makes mistakes. The question is whether your organization is structured to survive those mistakes, or whether a single weak password can bring everything down.

RaiseDash was built on the principle that safety, compliance, and security are interconnected. When you're tracking assets, managing inspections, and monitoring driver safety across dozens or hundreds of vehicles, you can't afford to piece together risk from five different systems while the clock is ticking. Unified visibility isn't just convenient. It's how you catch problems before they become catastrophes.

The trucking companies that will survive the next decade aren't the ones hoping they won't be targeted. They're the ones building resilience now, before they need it.

Because the only thing worse than a ransomware attack is a ransomware attack you weren't prepared for.

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Key Takeaways

Ransomware can end established businesses. KNP operated for 158 years before a single compromised password led to bankruptcy. Size and history don't protect you.

Speed matters. With breakout times measured in minutes, traditional manual response can't keep up. Organizations need automated detection and pre-planned response procedures.

Third-party risk is your risk. The ORBCOMM attack showed how vendor compromises cascade through the supply chain. Know your critical vendors and have contingency plans.

Basics beat complexity. Most attacks don't start with sophisticated exploits. They start with weak passwords, phishing emails, and unpatched systems. Get the fundamentals right first.

Preparation determines outcome. The difference between recovery and collapse often comes down to whether you had backups, segmentation, and incident response plans in place before the attack.

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RaiseDash provides fleet safety and compliance technology that helps trucking operations protect their cargo, drivers, and business. Learn more at raisedash.com.